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Small and medium-sized ¯rms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship
and arm's-length bank lending. We show that such heterogeneous multiple bank
¯nancing leads to a lower probability of ine±cient credit foreclosure than both
monopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing. Yet, in
order to reduce hold-up and coordination-failure risk, the relationship bank's frac-
tion of total ¯rm debt must not become too large. For ¯rms with intermediate
expected pro¯ts, the probability of ine±cient credit-renegotiation is shown to de-
crease along with the relationship bank's information precision. For ¯rms with
extremely high or extremely low expected returns, however, it increases.
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This paper addresses the question of why many ¯rms, particularly in European coun-
tries, borrow from several banks of which one often takes the position of a \relationship"
lender, whereas the others act as \arm's-length" lenders. While early empirical stud-
ies on the number of bank relationships conclude that ¯rms obtain a large fraction of
their debt from mainly one institution (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Harho® and KÄ orting,
1998), more recent work on both large and small- to medium-sized European companies
¯nds that ¯rms make use of a substantial number of bank relationships. Ongena and
Smith (2000), for instance, show that in their sample of 1079 large ¯rms from 20 Euro-
pean countries, more than 20% use eight or more banks, while less than 15% maintain
single-bank relationships. For Germany, Brunner and Krahnen (2006) ¯nd an average
number of 5.7 bank relationships per company, which is supported by Machauer and
Weber (2001). Additionally, it has been shown for Portuguese data that even if ¯rms
borrow from only one bank when starting their business, a large fraction of companies
substitutes single with multiple bank lending during the course of their lifes (Farinha
and Santos, 2002).
The prevalence of heterogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing has received scant attention
in the theoretical literature, however.1 The early literature on ¯nancial intermediation
mainly concentrated on either of the two types of bank ¯nancing: single relationship
banking on the one hand and multiple bank lending via homogeneous lending institu-
tions on the other. Regarding the characteristics of the two ¯nancing regimes, single
banking has generally been seen as bene¯cial for opaque ¯rms because it saves on mon-
itoring costs (Diamond, 1984). Particularly young and small ¯rms may ¯nd it di±cult
to credibly signal their quality in order to access the capital markets. A bank can solve
this problem of information asymmetry by gathering information about the borrower
prior to making the ¯nancing decision and by monitoring the ¯rm over the course of
the lending relationship. Increasing information precision along the duration of the re-
lationship should allow a more e±cient renegotiation of credit conditions, particularly
for ¯nancially-distressed companies who, eventually, may ¯nd their credit constraints
eased (Elsas and Krahnen, 1998). However, repeated borrowing gives the single bank an
opportunity to threaten to cut future lending to the ¯rm. Whenever information about
the ¯rm's credit quality cannot be credibly conveyed to other lending institutions, the
¯rm will have to pay a lemon's premium if it tries to approach other banks. This hold-
up problem gives the incumbent bank the chance to extract ex-post rents and makes
single relationship banking particularly costly for highly-pro¯table ¯rms (Sharpe, 1990;
Rajan, 1992).2
Competition among banks limits a single bank's ability to extract rents ex-post. Ad-
ditionally, it may protect the debtor against a sudden deterioration of the liquidity
position of a single bank (Diamond, 1991).3 Yet, multiple banks usually act as \arm's-
1For an overview on general key characteristics of banking in Europe, see Schmidt (2001) or Brittain
(2001).
2Ex-post rent extraction by the creditor may additionally distort entrepreneurial incentives ex-ante
and therefore lead to an ine±cient choice of investment projects (Von Thadden, 1992).
3Detragiache et al. (2000) consider the adverse selection problem that arises if a ¯rm needs to borrow
from non-relationship banks at the re¯nancing stage, because the relationship bank is unable to prolong
1length lenders": as competition does not allow individual rent-extraction from the ¯rm,
they will not invest into costly borrower-monitoring and hence rely on less precise in-
formation than a relationship bank.4 While this saves on banks' monitoring costs, it
raises the risk of ine±cient credit-renegotation decisions particularly for ¯rms of lower
credit quality. If ¯rms obtain funds from several small banks, a coordinated foreclosure
of credit by a signi¯cant fraction of lenders may force illiquid but otherwise solvent
companies into default. Coordination \failures" of this type have been characterized
as one of the main risks associated with a multiple lending regime (Morris and Shin,
2004).
Combining the two strands of the literature, Hubert and SchÄ afer (2002) compare the
isolated e®ects of single relationship lending on the one hand with those of a multitude
of small, homogeneous lending institutions on the other hand. They consider the case
where short-term debt holders obtain noisy information about the borrower's quality
and have to decide whether or not to prolong credit. Due to indivisibilities and the
sunk-cost character of a large fraction of a ¯rm's investment, a withdrawal of funds
may be troublesome even for a relatively healthy ¯rm, as refunding from new sources is
costly to ¯nd on short notice. This gives rise to strategic complementarities in lenders'
decisions: since credit withdrawal reduces the likelihood of the ¯rm's success, lenders
fear to be left alone, thereby resorting to the very preemptive action which undermines
the funded business project. Yet, the authors can show that the cost of this coordination
failure may still be lower than the cost arising from the renegotiating potential of a
single relationship lender. This holds in particular for the case of low information
asymmetry between the ¯rm and its lenders. Generally, they ¯nd that the costs from a
large monopolistic lender are highest for ¯rms with bright business prospects since this
allows the lender to appropriate substantial quasi-rents in the renegotiation process ex-
post, while the risk of coordination failure is highest for ¯rms with low expected returns.
These results are comparable to Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) who discuss the optimal
number of creditors from the perspective of ex-post bargaining problems and conclude
that ¯rms with high credit quality are better o® with two creditors rather than one.
Among the ¯rst papers taking into account the coexistence of relationship and arm's-
length bank lending in a theoretical model is the work by Elsas et al. (2004). The
authors derive the optimal debt structure, i.e. the optimal degree of relationship versus
arm's-length bank ¯nancing, from the trade-o® between the bargaining power of the
relationship bank and the risk of coordination failure from arm's-length banks. They
¯nd that ¯rms with high expected cash-°ows prefer a homogeneous multiple bank ¯-
nancing regime without a relationship bank, while ¯rms with low expected pro¯ts or
high asset speci¯city tend to be ¯nanced within a heterogeneous multiple banking sys-
tem. However, the authors assume that there is no information asymmetry between
the relationship bank and arm's-length banks. Yet, the higher precision of informa-
credit due to own liquidity problems.
4In this sense, arm's-length banks o®er a similar type of ¯nancing as the capital markets do. Since
small and medium-sized European ¯rms, in particular, are still shy to use the capital markets and
prefer to receive funds from banks, we refer to arm's-length bank lenders in the model rather than bond
holders. Only recently did German Mittelstand ¯rms, for instance, open up to other forms of lending
via the capital markets, as has been commented on by The Economist (November 2003): \Though
starved of bank loans, German companies are reluctant to tap alternative sources of capital."
2tion about the ¯rm's credit quality has continuously been mentioned as the distinctive
feature of relationship banking, so that the paper by Elsas et al. (2004) falls short of
this aspect. The distinguishing characteristics between the two lender types in their
study are simply the size of the banks' funds and the ability, respectively disability, to
renegotiate credit.
This paper, in contrast, explicitly considers information asymmetries between relation-
ship and arm's-length banks in a heterogeneous ¯nancing system.5 We assume that the
relationship bank is a large creditor by holding a substantial fraction of the ¯rm's total
debt and that she disposes of more precise information about the ¯rm. Our study hence
accounts for the particular importance that the degree of uncertainty in information
about borrower quality has for credit decisions. Additionally, we presume that the re-
lationship bank may renegotiate ¯nancing conditions, while arm's-length banks cannot.
We then analyze the banks' interaction with regard to the e±ciency of credit-re¯nancing
decisions.6 Furthermore, we compare the heterogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing regime
to both the case of single relationship lending and homogeneous multiple lending. In
this respect, we complement the earlier work by Hubert and SchÄ afer (2002) by a richer
structure of lender types.
In our model, two di®erent e®ects, pertaining to the di®erent characteristics of the
relationship bank, interplay and in°uence the results. First, due to her ability to rene-
gotiate repayment conditions, the relationship bank may ease or tighten the ¯rm's
¯nancial constraints by asking for a lower or higher repayment rate. While the former
leads to a bene¯cial smoothing of the ¯rm's budget constraints, the latter may be seen
as a manifestation of the hold-up e®ect. Second, since the result of the renegotiation
process between ¯rm and relationship bank is observable to arm's-length banks, the
relationship bank's actions allow for a signalling function that may help to coordinate
the decisions of arm's-length banks. The coordination-e®ect gains momentum in the re-
lationship bank's information precision, such that arm's-length banks will simply follow
the relationship bank's action if she is known to possess completely precise information.
Still, coordination may lead to both a more or less e±cient outcome. This is due to the
fact that a reduction in the charged repayment rate by the relationship bank is taken as
a signal for a low ¯rm quality, while an increase in the requested repayment rate signals
high expected ¯rm returns.
Our results are multi-faceted and di®erentiate between a system where the relationship
bank disposes of very but not in¯nitely precise information and the limit where she
possesses completely precise information about her borrower. If we consider that the
bank's precision of information about the ¯rm's credit quality rises with the duration
of the relationship, we may assume that the former case is found in early stages, the
latter in more mature stages of the lending relationship.
In the early stages, incidences of ine±cient credit-renegotiation, i.e. of premature
5In contrast to Carletti (2004), who analyzes how the number of bank relationships in°uences banks'
monitoring incentives, we assume that only one of the banks truly acts as a relationship lender and,
hence, may obtain more precise information about the ¯rm than all other bank lenders.
6In a more general global games setting, the in°uence of large players on ¯nancial crises has been
analyzed by Corsetti et al. (2001) and Bannier (2005). In contrast to these models, however, in our
case the large player may additionally renegotiate the ¯nancial contract.
3credit termination, decrease along with the relationship bank's precision of informa-
tion for ¯rms with intermediate expected pro¯ts. The net-e®ect of the relationship
bank's renegotiation- and coordination-in°uence hence turns out to be bene¯cial and
to strengthen in the bank's information precision. By guaranteeing access to ¯nance
even for ¯rms of less than very high quality,7 the relationship bank thus injects a de-
gree of strategic solidity. On the downside, however, ¯rms with extremely high or
extremely low expected returns face a higher likelihood of ine±cient credit termination
the more precise the relationship bank's information becomes. For ¯rms with extremely
high expected returns, the relationship bank renegotiates an extremely high repayment
rate, such that the adverse hold-up e®ect overcompensates any bene¯cial coordination
e®ect. For ¯rms with extremely low expected cash-°ows, in contrast, the intertemporal-
smoothing e®ect via a reduction of the renegotiated repayment by the relationship bank
is not su±ciently strong to outweigh a coordination failure by arm's-length banks.
Comparing heterogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing to monopolistic relationship banking,
we ¯nd that ine±cient credit termination is always less likely under the ¯rst regime.
This holds irrespective of the ¯rm's expected quality. As an explanation, consider that
a monopolistic relationship bank will always request the highest feasible repayment
rate such that the hold-up problem is maximized. In a heterogeneous bank ¯nancing
system, in contrast, the renegotiation-e®ect is limited as it a®ects only the relation-
ship bank's (comparably smaller) fraction of ¯rm debt. At the same time, an increase
in the repayment requested by the relationship bank is perceived as a signal of high
¯rm quality by arm's-length banks. The subsequent bene¯cial coordination-e®ect re-
duces the initial negative hold-up e®ect. However, a reduction in the repayment to the
relationship bank will be interpreted as a signal of low ¯rm quality, so that the risk
of coordination-failure increases. Compared to homogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing,
therefore, a heterogeneous regime only fares better if the renegotiation-e®ect is guaran-
teed to be relatively small, i.e. if the relationship bank's fraction of total ¯rm debt and
the charged repayment rate may not become too large.
In the mature stages of the relationship, when the relationship bank disposes of com-
pletely precise private information about the ¯rm, our model shows that she always
charges the maximum feasible repayment. Thus, the renegotiation-in°uence always
gives rise to a hold-up problem, but its impact is limited due to the existence of arm's-
length loans. Additionally, arm's-length banks will always follow the relationship bank's
strategy as she is known to be perfectly informed about the ¯rm. Heterogeneous bank
¯nancing therefore reduces the likelihood of ine±cient credit termination compared
to monopoly relationship banking. Yet, due to the maximum repayment request, the
relationship bank is no longer able to signal the ¯rm's quality via variations in the re-
payment rate. Therefore, when compared to a homogeneous multiple banking context,
a heterogeneous system leads to more e±cient credit-renegotiation only if the relation-
ship bank's fraction of debt is relatively small, such that the hold-up e®ect is limited
su±ciently strongly.
From the banks' point of view, a heterogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing system is ad-
vantageous as well, given the limitations with regard to the relationship bank's in°uence
as mentioned above. Generally, banks bene¯t from the reduction of the borrower's de-
7In the following, we refer to the expected ¯rm pro¯ts and the ¯rm's \quality" interchangeably.
4fault probability. Additionally, we can show that the relationship bank earns higher
expected pro¯ts from the credit relationship if the ¯rm obtains loans from multiple
arm's-length banks as well. As a reason, consider that in a heterogeneous bank ¯nanc-
ing system, apart from renegotiating the repayment rate, she may also try to coordinate
arm's-length banks' behavior in her favor, thereby trying to maximize the amount of
repayment while minimizing the probability of default at the same time.
Our results match a number of stylized facts established from empirical studies on
relationship lending in a heterogeneous banking system. Elsas and Krahnen (1998) ¯nd
that relationship banks, \housebanks" in their terminology, develop a truly distinct
lending behavior despite competition from other banking institutions. Based on data
from the German credit market, they show that relationship banks increase ¯nancing to
borrowers of deteriorating, but still sustainable, quality. Similarly, Foglia et al. (1998),
based on Italian data, conclude that the existence of relationship lending from one
speci¯c banking institution increases ¯rms' general access to credit. Even some of our
more detailed results are matched by empirical ¯ndings. In particular, D'Auria et al.
(1999) concur that with regard to the pricing of loans, a privileged relationship to one
particular lender may be preferable, i.e. leading to lower cost of capital for the ¯rm,
as long as the relationship bank's share of total borrowing does not get so large as to
represent a virtual monopoly.
The model may also be extended into other directions. For instance, our results may
be important for the optimal structure of lending syndicates, in which often one lead-
bank coordinates the decisions of other syndicate members.8 One further parallel may
be drawn with respect to the role of banks in out-of-court restructuring of debt and
the resolution of ¯nancial distress. James (1995, 1996) ¯nds that bank participation in
debt restructuring transactions facilitates public debt exchange o®ers.9 However, bank
concessions are usually contingent upon the successful completion of the public debt ex-
change o®er.10 This has been taken up in a theoretical examination by Pagratis (2005),
who ¯nds that the bank, by drawing on collective wisdom of the other lenders' restruc-
turing decisions, injects a degree of strategic stability. For German ¯rms facing distress,
Brunner and Krahnen (2006) have found that bank pools may overcome coordination
problems and increase the probability of workout success, provided that the number
of pool members remains small. This may well point into the same direction as our
results because a smaller number of pool members may be expected to lead to higher
heterogeneity between banks. As our model shows, a su±ciently heterogeneous group
of banks may reduce the probability of ine±cient debt restructuring, since it enables
e±cient coordination at lowest (hold-up) costs.
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the general model of heterogeneous
multiple bank ¯nancing in which a ¯rm obtains credit from a relationship bank and
a multitude of arm's-length banks. Section 3 examines the characteristics of this ¯-
nancing system provided that the relationship bank disposes of ¯nitely precise private
information. The results are compared to a market where the relationship bank acts
8I am very thankful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the relation to this topic.
9Likewise, Gilson, Kose and Lang (1990) point out that the probability of out-of-court restructuring
is positively related to a ¯rm's reliance on bank debt.
10This is in contrast to our model where the less-informed participants make their decisions contingent
on the informed bank's action rather than the other way round.
5as a monopolist and to a homogeneous multiple banking regime. Section 4 studies the
limiting case where the relationship bank obtains private information of in¯nitely high
precision. Again, a comparative statics analysis is followed by a comparison of di®erent
banking regimes. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model considers a simple economy with three types of risk-neutral agents:11 a ¯rm,
a relationship bank and a continuum of (small) arm's-length banks.12 The ¯rm has no
¯nancial resources and intends to implement a risky project that requires an investment
of 1. Both types of bank lenders are approached by the ¯rm in order to raise short-
term funds. Provided that initial ¯nancing decisions are successful, the project starts
in t = 1 and matures in t = 3. At an intermediate stage, lenders have to decide whether
or not to prolong credit, so that the project is threatened by early liquidation.13 Early
liquidation is ine±cient if the project's quality is su±ciently high.
The bank ¯nancing system is heterogeneous in three respects. First, it is assumed
that the relationship bank has been maintaining long-term relations with the ¯rm and
therefore disposes of more precise information about the ¯rm than arm's-length banks.
In this respect, we assume that while the project's quality µ is unobservable to any bank,
the relationship bank observes a noisy private signal xR = µ + " with " » N(0;1=®),
while small banks observe individual private signals xALi = µ + "i with "i » N(0;1=¯).
It is assumed that " and "i are independent of each other and of µ and that ® ¸ ¯.
Second, the relationship bank grants a loan of non-negligible size. In particular, her loan
provides a fraction ¸ of total ¯rm debt. Arm's-length banks, in contrast, grant loans
that are negligibly small individually but amount to a combined proportion of 1 ¡ ¸ of
total ¯rm debt.14 Third, the relationship bank may renegotiate ¯nancing conditions,
while arm's-length banks cannot. Arm's-length banks are therefore distinguished from
the relationship bank by a smaller ¯nancial \size", a lower precision of information
about the borrower's credit quality and the disability to renegotiate.
The model has the following time structure:
² In t = 0, the ¯rm approaches the banks in order to raise capital for a risky
11The assumption of risk-neutrality greatly helps to simplify equilibrium derivation and to focus on the
pure interactions between banks without additional moral hazard concerns due to risk-aversion. Risk-
neutrality should certainly be a reasonable characterization for well-diversi¯ed banks. With regard
to the ¯rm, it is arguably more di±cult to defend the assumption of risk-neutrality. Still, several
experimental studies have been able to show that agents often tend to display features of risk-neutrality
rather than of risk-aversion (Neugebauer and Selten, 2006; Neugebauer and Perote, 2006).
12Empirical studies found that for medium-sized European ¯rms, the number of banking relationships
varies between 1 and 70 (Ongena and Smith, 2000). In the model, the assumption of a continuum of
arm's length lenders is made for simplicity and does not qualitatively in°uence the results.
13In essence, the model considers short-term, revolving loans. Alternatively, we may think of longer-
term loans that include covenants. These may allow the banks to foreclose their loans in certain
circumstances. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we assume all loans to have identical
maturity.
14Due to their negligible ¯nancial mass, we refer to arm's-length banks also as \small" banks.
6business project. The ¯rm o®ers a repayment of r(> 1) per unit of capital in
t = 3. Provided that ¯nancing decisions have been successful, the ¯rm invests in
the project.15
² In t = 1, project quality µ is realized from a normal distribution N(¹µ;¾µ) and
banks receive noisy private signals about the realized value of µ. Based on her
private information, the relationship bank decides whether to renegotiate the re-
payment and extend credit or to foreclose the loan. The arm's-length banks ob-
serve her actions and decide whether to extend or withdraw their loans as well.16
Early foreclosures deliver a liquidation value of K < r per unit of capital for both
types of lenders.
² In t = 2, project quality µ becomes uncovered. The ¯rm makes her choice whether
to invest additional e®ort V into the project and re¯nance the foreclosed fraction
of loans or to terminate the project prematurely. In the latter case, the ¯nal
liquidation value of the project is normalized to zero.
² In t = 3, if the project has not been terminated prematurely, the project's cash-
°ow is realized and equals µ. Credit is repaid with the ¯rm holding the residual
claim.17
All bargaining power is supposed to rest with the relationship bank. The repayment rate
renegotiated by the relationship bank is referred to as rR. Early liquidation value K may
also be interpreted as the collateral that may be seized by the banks in the intermediate
period. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, K is assumed to be the same
for all banks, while in reality it would certainly be an additional negotiation parameter
of the relationship bank. However, we consider that it is more costly for the ¯rm to
re¯nance a loan withdrawn by the relationship bank, WR, than to re¯nance arm's-length
banks' loans, i.e. WR ¸ WAL ¸ r. Note that WR is the maximum feasible amount of
repayment that the relationship bank can demand and hence puts an upper boundary on
the hold-up cost per unit of relationship-credit. In order to simplify the analysis, e®ort
V is normalized to zero. Finally, we assume ¾µ ! 1, i.e. we examine the limiting case
where the variance of µ becomes very large, so that banks dispose of hardly any prior
information about the project quality. This assumption should be justi¯ed particularly
for small and medium-sized ¯rms that are informationally opaque. Furthermore, since
the focus of our study is on the banks' conditional beliefs after observing their noisy
private signals, imposing an improper prior distribution on µ considerably simpli¯es the
analysis without altering the core results.18
The equilibrium of the game can be obtained by solving the sequential model backwards.
At the last stage of the game, the ¯rm has to decide whether to re¯nance the withdrawn
fraction of loans or to terminate the project altogether. If the project is terminated, the
¯rm receives a payo® of zero. If the withdrawn money is re¯nanced, the ¯rm receives
15Note that we do not analyze the initial ¯nancing decisions by the banks. Our model is focussed
solely on the credit continuation decision in t = 1.
16The relationship bank may therefore use her actions as a signal to the arm's-length banks.
17Note that the non-identical maturity of loans and ¯rm project is not critical given a discount factor
of zero, which we assume here.
18For a more detailed discussion of the improper prior assumption see Morris and Shin (2003).
7payo® ¼F(re¯nance) = µ¡¸rR¡(1¡¸)(1¡l)r¡(1¡¸)lWAL whenever the relationship
bank decides to renegotiate the repayment and extends credit. Here, l denotes the
proportion of small banks that foreclose their loans. If, instead, the relationship bank
chooses to withdraw her loan prematurely, the ¯rm's payo® from re¯nancing is given
by ¼F(re¯nance) = µ ¡ ¸WR ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)(1 ¡ l)r ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)lWAL. Note that the ¯rm's
payo® from continuing the project and re¯nancing withdrawn credits decreases in the
number of banks withdrawing their loans. In this respect, the model gives rise to
strategic complementarities among banks' actions: the larger the number of banks that
withdraw, the higher is the incentive of the individual bank to foreclose the loan, since
it becomes less likely that the ¯rm will decide to re¯nance and continue the project.
Assuming that it is optimal for the ¯rm to employ a trigger strategy,19 we ¯nd the
following. If the relationship bank extends credit, the ¯rm will terminate the project
rather than re¯nance the withdrawn funds whenever the realized project value µ is lower
than
µ¤
1 = ¸rR + (1 ¡ ¸)r + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)l:
If, instead, the relationship bank chooses to foreclose the loan, the ¯rm will terminate
the project for values of µ lower than
µ¤
2 = ¸WR + (1 ¡ ¸)r + (1 ¡ ¸)(WAL ¡ r)l:
In order to interpret the equilibrium values µ¤
1 and µ¤
2, it is useful to introduce two
boundary values for µ. Let µ1 be the threshold value of the project cash-°ow that renders
the ¯rm indi®erent between terminating the project and re¯nancing the withdrawn
part of the loan, if all ¯nanciers (including the relationship bank) extend their loan,
i.e. µ1 = ¸rR + (1 ¡ ¸)r. Similarly, let µ2 be the threshold value that makes the ¯rm
indi®erent between terminating and re¯nancing if all ¯nanciers withdraw their loan, i.e.
µ2 = ¸WR +(1¡¸)WAL. Hence, for l ! 0, µ¤
1 converges to µ1 from above, for l ! 1, µ¤
2
converges to µ2 from below.
Fig. 1 shows the structure of project cash-°ows and the corresponding equilibrium
outcomes. Whenever the realized return of the ¯rm's project is below µ1, the project
-
termination with
termination if RB forecloses,
termination even if no termination even
no termination
µ
z }| {z }| {
z }| {
z }| {z }| {
no termination if RB rolls over





Figure 1: Range of project values
19Morris and Shin (2004) have shown that trigger strategies are uniquely optimal strategies in global
games. We will therefore in the following solely rely on the derivation of an equilibrium in trigger
strategies.
8will be terminated with certainty, even if all small banks and the relationship bank
(RB) extend their loans. For this range of very low project qualities, terminating the
project is the e±cient choice for the ¯rm. If µ1 < µ < µ¤
1, the proportion of arm's-length
banks optimally withdrawing their loans is still so high that the ¯rm will decide not
to continue the project even if the relationship bank renegotiates the repayment and
rolls over the loan. However, terminating the project is not e±cient any more, since
it is not warranted by the project's quality: the ¯rm would have proceeded with the
project if only the proportion of withdrawn credit had been smaller. For µ¤
1 < µ < µ¤
2,
the outcome depends entirely on the behavior of the relationship bank. If she decides
to renegotiate and extend credit, the ¯rm will choose to re¯nance the money withdrawn
from the small banks. If, however, the relationship bank forecloses the loan, the ¯rm
will choose to terminate the project. Whenever the project quality is higher than µ¤
2 but
lower than µ2, the ¯rm will decide to proceed with the project even if the relationship
bank chooses to foreclose the loan. For µ > µ2, the project cash-°ow is so high that the
project succeeds with certainty, no matter what the small banks and the relationship
bank decide to do.20
In the following, we will derive the optimal strategies for the banks. Relying on trigger
strategies, small banks are indi®erent between foreclosing and extending their loans
exactly after observing a private signal of x¤
AL. The proportion l of arm's-length banks
withdrawing their money in t = 1 is then given by those who receive private information
lower than x¤
AL, i.e. l = prob(xAL · x¤
ALjµ):21 The equilibrium values for the project
cash-°ow, µ¤
1 and µ¤
2, are then resolved as
µ¤












where ©(¢) denotes the cumulative normal distribution.22 Note that threshold values
µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 cannot be derived explicitly, but are given as implicit functions. Still, their
features may be recognized from a graphical representation, see ¯gure 2 as an example,
or from simulations.
For x¤
AL to be a trigger for the arm's-length banks' decision of whether to withdraw
or extend credit, both actions have to deliver the same expected payo® when a private
signal of xALi = x¤
AL is observed, i.e.
¼AL(foreclosejxALi = x¤
AL) = ¼AL(extendjxALi = x¤
AL)
K = r ¢ prob(µ ¸ µ¤
2jxALi = x¤
AL)
+ r ¢ prob(µ¤




20The interval [µ1;µ2] is the typical range where multiple equilibria occur in a homogeneous banking
regime whenever the project value µ is common knowledge. Hence, in this interval both credit with-
drawal and credit extension are self-sustaining equilibria that lead to (ine±cient) project termination
or (e±cient) project continuation, respectively.
21Note that, due to the assumed independence of signal noise, the proportion of banks receiving
private information lower than x
¤
AL is equal to the probability with which an individual bank observes
a signal lower than x
¤
AL.






f2(µ1) = ¸rR + (1 ¡ ¸)r
f(µ1)





Figure 2: Equilibrium value µ¤
1, determined by the intersection of the two functions f1
and f2
Whenever a project value higher than µ¤
2 is realized, the ¯rm will continue the project
irrespective of the relationship bank's decision. For project values between µ¤
1 and µ¤
2,
however, continuation of the project critically depends on the relationship bank's action.
Even though arm's-length banks can observe her decision, they still have to calculate
the probability that the project value lies in the interval [µ¤
1;µ¤
2], conditional on their
observation and private information xAL.
The trigger value x¤
R for the relationship bank is determined by a similar condition of
indi®erence
¼R(foreclosejxR = x¤
R) = ¼R(renegotiate and extendjxR = x¤
R)




rR = arg max
r·WR
















for all xR ¸ x¤
R: (4)
The optimal repayment for the relationship bank is then the rR that balances two
di®erent e®ects on her expected payo®. First, there is a positive e®ect of an increase
in rR due to higher repayment per unit of capital whenever credit is repaid. Second,
however, a higher repayment to the relationship bank a®ects the threshold value µ¤
1 that
has to be exceeded by cash-°ow µ for the project to be continued and hence for credit
to be repaid. Interestingly, the e®ect of an increase in rR on µ¤
1 may be both positive
23See also appendix A.
10and negative. On the one hand, a higher repayment to the relationship bank leads to
higher cost of capital to the ¯rm. This, in turn, requires a higher project cash-°ow µ
for the project to be continued. Hence, it reduces the incidence of credit repayment via
an increase in µ¤
1, which may be denoted as the \cost"-e®ect of rR on µ¤
1. On the other
hand, small banks, knowing about the relationship bank's informational advantage,
may interpret an increase in rR as a sign that the relationship bank observed more
optimistic information about the project value. This, in turn, makes it more reasonable
for small banks to extend their loans, so that µ¤
1 decreases. This second impact may be
referred to as the \information"-e®ect of rR on µ¤
1. Both e®ects are strengthened by the
relationship bank's fraction of total ¯rm debt, ¸, since it determines both the fraction
of capital that succumbs to the renegotiation process but also the proportion of credit
that will be extended.24
The relationship bank's indi®erence condition (3) leads to the following equation de¯n-













Whenever the relationship bank observes private information lower than x¤
R she will
foreclose the loan. For private information higher than x¤
R, however, she will renegotiate
the repayment rate and roll over the loan.
Based on the anticipated strategy of the ¯rm and the observed behavior of the relation-
ship bank, arm's-length banks are indi®erent between foreclosing and extending their

























For signals lower than x¤
AL they will withdraw, for higher signals they will extend credit.
The equilibrium in trigger strategies is hence described by equations (1), (2), (5) and
(6).
Note that the relationship bank's e®ects on the ¯rm's budget constraints are manifested
in rR. Whenever the relationship bank requests a higher repayment rate, i.e. rR > r,
this may be attributed to her ability to hold-up the ¯rm, whereas a decrease in repay-
ment, i.e. rR < r, clearly eases the ¯rm's budget constraints. The coordination-e®ect,
in contrast, shows up in threshold value µ¤
1 (and also in µ¤
2) and may be decomposed
into the cost-e®ect and the information-e®ect as described above.
The following section analyzes the equilibrium in more detail, with emphasis on the
relationship bank's action serving as a (coordinating) signal. We furthermore compare
the model of heterogeneous multiple credit relations to a setting with a relationship bank
acting as monopolist and also to a completely homogeneous credit market consisting
solely of arm's-length banks.
24Note that the e®ect of rR on µ
¤
1 captures the net-e®ect of the initially introduced impact of the
relationship bank on the ¯rm's ¯nancial constraints and on the coordinated behavior by arm's-length
banks.
25For the derivation of the equilibrium equation for arm's-length banks see appendix B.
113 Analysis of Financing Regimes - Finitely Precise Infor-
mation
3.1 Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing
One of the key features of relationship lending is that the relationship bank may rene-
gotiate the rate that has to be repaid on her fraction of debt.26 Since the bargaining
result is observable, the relationship bank may try to signal her information to the rest
of the market. Before we investigate the impact of the bargaining process on the equi-
librium, we will analyze in which way the relationship bank's information in°uences the
renegotiated repayment rate rR. Based on these results, we will then examine how her
decision to foreclose or to renegotiate the repayment rate and extend the loan impacts
the threshold values µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 of the project. Since for all µ ¸ µ1 credit termination is
ine±cient, we will interpret a decrease in µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 as a reduction in the (ex-ante) prob-
ability of ine±cient credit termination, respectively of project liquidation, as it reduces
the state space of ine±cient credit decisions.
For the e®ect of the relationship bank's private information xR on the repayment rate
rR, we ¯nd the following:
Lemma 1 For @2µ¤
1=(@rR@xR) su±ciently small (high), the relationship bank requests
a higher (lower) repayment rate with improving information, i.e. with higher signal xR.
For proof, see appendix C.
A higher signal xR increases the relationship bank's posterior expectation with respect
to project cash-°ow. Hence, she may try to charge a higher repayment in order to extract
the higher expected net pro¯t from the ¯rm. However, she knows that threshold µ¤
1 is
in°uenced by her choice of rR. As a consequence, @rR=@xR is positive only if the cross
derivative, @2µ¤
1=(@rR@xR), is su±ciently small or even negative. I.e., the relationship
bank will increase the interest rate along with an improvement in signal value xR only if
she expects her information to either reduce the cost-e®ect (@µ¤
1=@rR > 0) or to increase
the information e®ect (@µ¤
1=@rR < 0). Otherwise, she will demand a lower repayment
rate along with an increase in xR.
Likewise, the impact of the relationship bank's information precision ® on the renego-
tiated repayment rate rR depends on the repayment rate's e®ect on threshold µ¤
1:
Lemma 2 For @2µ¤
1=(@rR@®) su±ciently small (high), more precise private informa-
tion induces the relationship bank to bargain for a higher (lower) repayment rate. For
intermediate private information xR, the renegotiated repayment rate rR will very likely
decrease along with information precision ®, while for extreme signals xR the opposite
holds.
For proof, see appendix D.
26Note that due to the assumption that all the bargaining power rests with the relationship bank, the
renegotiated repayment, in a take-it-or-leave-it o®er, extracts all the ex-ante expected surplus from the
¯rm.
12Again, the relationship bank increases the repayment rate along with increasing infor-
mation precision only if an increase in ® goes along with a reduction of the cost e®ect,
respectively with a strengthening of the information e®ect. This will most likely be the
case for extremely high or low signals xR. For intermediate private information xR, in
contrast, the relationship bank will tend to reduce the repayment rate with increasing
precision of information.
In the following, we will analyze the in°uence of the renegotiated repayment rate rR on
the equilibrium values µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 that the cash-°ow has to exceed for the project to be
continued.
Lemma 3 Equilibrium values µ¤
1 and µ¤


















































The in°uence of rR on the strategy of arm's-length banks plays a pivotal role for the
model. In particular, it determines whether the information-e®ect or the cost-e®ect
of the renegotiation process dominates, so that the threshold values µ¤
1 and µ¤
2 either
decrease or increase in rR. However, the sign of the derivative @x¤
AL=@rR is not fully
determined. Yet, a combination of the results derived so far allows interesting interpre-
tations with regard to the e±ciency of credit decisions and is given in proposition 1. It
sums up the e®ects of the relationship bank's information precision on credit extension
and project continuation. The results di®erentiate between extreme pro¯t expectations
and intermediate expectations as perceived by the relationship bank, i.e. extreme or
intermediate values of xR.
Proposition 1 Increasingly (decreasingly) precise private information held by the re-
lationship bank reduces (raises) the incidence of ine±cient credit termination for ¯rms
perceived as of intermediate quality. The opposite holds for ¯rms whose expected cash-
°ows are extremely high or low.
Table 1 delineates the mechanisms for the case of an increase in the relationship bank's
information precision.
Table 1: E®ects of an increase in ®
intermediate values xR extreme values xR (good or bad)
@x¤
AL
@rR > 0 rR # ) x¤
AL #, µ¤
1 #, µ¤






@rR < 0 rR " ) x¤
AL #, µ¤
1 #, µ¤




No matter whether cost-e®ect (@x¤
AL=@rR > 0) or information-e®ect (@x¤
AL=@rR < 0)
dominate, whenever the relationship bank obtains more precise information, the risk of
13ine±cient credit termination is reduced for ¯rms perceived as of intermediate quality
by the relationship bank, but is increased for ¯rms with extreme expected pro¯ts. The
opposite holds for a decreasing precision of information held by the relationship bank.
How can this result be interpreted? Let us consider the case of ¯rms perceived to be
of intermediate value ¯rst. The relationship bank will always try to use both cost-
and information-e®ect in order to maximize her proceeds from lending to the ¯rm.
Hence, whenever the cost-e®ect dominates, she will be cautious and tend to lower the
repayment rate with increasing information precision. This induces the small banks
to extend their loans for even lower signals xAL, so that the incidence of ine±cient
liquidation is reduced. If the information-e®ect dominates, in contrast, the relationship
bank will raise the repayment rate. This signals a su±ciently good ¯rm quality to the
arm's-length banks, so that again they will extend credit for a larger range of signal
values xAL and the probability of ¯rm default will be reduced.
For ¯rms with either extremely high or extremely low expected cash-°ows, however, the
relationship bank's strategy may be characterized as the trial to maximize her proceeds
despite cost- and information-e®ect. E.g., if the relationship bank expects an extremely
high ¯rm cash-°ow (observes a high signal xR) and the cost-e®ect dominates, she will
ask for a higher repayment along with ®, even though she knows that this will have
a detrimental e®ect on the threshold µ¤
1 that decides on the ¯rm's default. But as xR
is extremely high, she hopes that the ¯rm's quality will be su±ciently high to surpass
µ¤
1 even though this threshold will be raised by an increase in rR. If, in contrast, the
relationship bank observes an extremely low value xR, she will have to ask for a high
repayment rate despite the cost-e®ect in order to maximize her repayment from a loan
that is prolonged. If the information-e®ect dominates in this case, she will request a
lower repayment rate in the hope of stimulating the ¯rm's ¯nances su±ciently strongly
so that the threshold µ¤
1 will be passed even though she knows that the arm's-length
banks will take her action as a signal that the ¯rm is of low quality and will therefore
tend to cease credit prolongation.
In order to reduce ine±cient credit termination incidences, ¯rms with intermediate
expected pro¯ts should therefore disclose information of maximum precision to the re-
lationship bank. Firms with extremely low or extremely high expected cash-°ows, in
contrast, should disclose information of minimum precision to the relationship lender.
While by doing so the probability of project liquidation can be minimized, the de-
velopment of the requested repayment by the relationship bank depends on whether
cost-e®ect (reduction of rR) or information-e®ect (increase in rR) dominate.
3.2 Comparing Financing Regimes
In the following, we will ¯rst compare the system of heterogeneous multiple bank ¯nanc-
ing to single relationship banking, i.e. to a monopoly of the relationship bank (¸ = 1).
Secondly, we will analyze the case where only arm's-length debt is available (¸ = 0), so
that the ¯rm holds multiple credit relations with homogeneous small banks.
Monopoly Relationship Lending
From the ¯rm's indi®erence condition it follows that with single relationship lending the
14critical value of the project up to which the ¯rm always chooses to terminate the project
rather than re¯nance is ^ µ = WR. By renegotiating the repayment rate, the relationship
bank tries to maximize her pro¯t from extending the loan. Feasibility requires ^ rR · WR,
so that
^ rR = arg max
r·WR
r ¢ prob(µ · ^ µjxR = ^ xR) = WR :
Hence, the relationship bank always demands the maximum repayment, so that the
intertemporal-smoothing e®ect vanishes and the ¯rm succumbs to maximal hold-up.
The relationship bank is then indi®erent between withdrawing and extending the loan
if
¼R(withdraw) = ¼R(extend)
K = WR ¢ prob(µ ¸ ^ µjxR = ^ xR)








Based on equilibrium values ^ rR, ^ µ and ^ xR, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 4 The incidence of ine±cient project termination with single relationship bank-
ing is at least as high as with heterogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing.
Proof:
µ¤
1 = ¸rR + (1 ¡ ¸)[(1 ¡ l)r + lWAL] · WR = ^ µ;
since due to feasibility of the bargaining process rR · WR. ¤
Additionally, we ¯nd that the relationship bank herself may have a material interest in
competition by small banks.
Lemma 5 As long as the renegotiated repayment rate rR does not fall too short of the
monopoly rate ^ rR = WR, the relationship bank has an explicit interest in competition by
arm's-length banks.
Proof:
rR ¢ prob(µ ¸ µ¤






















1)) is lower than or at most equal to 1, the inequality holds as long as
the renegotiated repayment rate in a heterogeneous multiple banking regime, rR, does
not fall too short of the monopoly rate ^ rR = WR. ¤
Even though the relationship bank charges the highest repayment rate in a monopoly
situation (i.e. rR · ^ rR = WR), so that hold-up costs are maximal, her expected
payo® is not necessarily higher than in a competitive situation. This is due to the fact
that the very lowering of the renegotiated repayment rate may coordinate small banks'
behavior towards extending rather than foreclosing their loans. This, in turn, increases
15the probability that the ¯rm will continue the project and credit will be repaid. Single
relationship lending lacks this coordination-e®ect that may contribute strongly to the
relationship bank's pro¯t.
Homogeneous Multiple Bank Financing
If the only source of ¯nancing is a continuum of small banks, the ¯rm's indi®erence
condition delivers a trigger value of ~ µ = r + (WAL ¡ r)l, up to which she terminates
the project but proceeds for higher cash-°ows. The small banks' indi®erence condition
yields the following equilibrium value for their private signals








Hence, since all banks with private information lower than ~ xAL will foreclose their loans,
equilibrium value ~ µ can be expressed as ~ µ = r+(WAL¡r)©(
p
¯(~ xAL¡~ µ)). Substituting
for ~ xAL then delivers




When comparing homogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing to the heterogeneous system
of section 3.1, we have to distinguish two di®erent scenarios: either the relationship
bank renegotiated the repayment rate and rolled over the loan or she foreclosed the
loan. Let us ¯rst analyze the case of \e±cient coordination" of lenders, in which the
relationship bank extends the loan. It might be expected that in a heterogeneous system
the incidence of ine±cient credit termination is lower than in a homogeneous setting,
i.e. µ¤
1 < ~ µ, since due to the relationship bank's non-negligible fraction of debt a lower
amount of coordination among the individual small banks is necessary to yield the
e±cient outcome. We ¯nd that this is indeed the case, if














In contrast, if the relationship bank withdraws the loan, we ¯nd that the event of inef-
¯cient termination of projects is lower with heterogeneous than homogeneous multiple
bank ¯nancing, i.e. µ¤
2 < ~ µ, if
¸ <
WALK











Lemma 6 Whenever the relationship bank causes relatively low hold-up costs for the
¯rm, i.e. if either the repayment rate rR or her fraction of total debt ¸ are su±ciently
small, the incidence of ine±cient project liquidation is lower in a system with heteroge-
neous rather than homogeneous multiple credit relations.
164 Analysis of Financing Regimes - In¯nitely Precise In-
formation
4.1 Heterogeneous Multiple Bank Financing
Apart from being able to renegotiate the repayment and providing a non-negligible
fraction of total ¯rm debt, the relationship bank disposes of relatively more precise
private information about the ¯rm and its project. In the extreme, we may analyze the
case in which the relationship bank's information is completely precise, i.e. ® ! 1.













1 ! ¸rR +
1
2
(1 ¡ ¸)(WAL + r)
µ¤¤








(1 ¡ ¸)(WAL + r) :
With completely precise information, the relationship bank demands the maximum fea-
sible repayment, i.e. rR = WR, so that hold-up costs are maximized and intertemporal
smoothing no longer exists. Since arm's-length banks know that the relationship bank
disposes of fully precise information, their optimal strategy is to behave in the same way









(1 ¡ ¸)(WAL + r) = µ¤¤
1
This threshold value increases in the relationship bank's \size" ¸, in re¯nancing costs
WAL and WR, and in the repayment rates r and rR. As the repayment requested by the
relationship bank does no longer vary with the bank's expectations about ¯rm quality,
the information-e®ect vanishes. The renegotiation process is then completely dominated
by the cost-e®ect.
4.2 Comparing Financing Regimes
A completely informed relationship bank acting as monopolist is characterized by the
following equilibrium values:
^ ^ µ = ^ ^ xR = WR :
As before, we ¯nd that the event of ine±cient project liquidation is never higher with
heterogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing than when the relationship bank acts as monop-
olist, i.e. µ¤¤
1 · ^ ^ µ.
When comparing threshold value µ¤¤
1 from a heterogeneous system, given that the re-
lationship bank disposes of completely precise private information, with the threshold
17level for the project's value in a homogeneous system, we ¯nd that µ¤¤
1 < ~ ~ µ whenever




















i.e. for su±ciently low cost of capital caused by the relationship bank. Note that this




Since with completely precise information the relationship bank will charge the maxi-
mum feasible repayment rate irrespective of the project value, heterogeneous multiple
bank ¯nancing can only reduce the event of ine±cient project liquidation compared to
a homogeneous banking regime, if the relationship bank's fraction of total ¯rm debt
is su±ciently small, so that the severity of the hold-up problem for the ¯rm's cost of
capital does not become too strong.
Lemma 7 With completely precise information held by the relationship bank, the in-
cidence of ine±cient project liquidation is always lower in a system of heterogeneous
multiple bank ¯nancing than with single relationship banking. Compared to a homoge-
neous system, however, this holds only if the relationship bank's fraction of total ¯rm
debt is su±ciently low.
5 Conclusion
Heterogeneous bank ¯nancing systems predominate in many countries. In particular
small and medium-sized ¯rms seem to prefer obtaining capital from both a well-informed
relationship bank and a multitude of less well-informed arm's-length banks. Our study
points to the asymmetric informational positions of the involved banking institutions
as an explanatory factor for the prevalence of these ¯nancing systems.
Assuming that the relationship bank's information precision rises with the duration
of the credit relation, we ¯nd that heterogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing is a self-
sustaining regime for ¯rms with moderate expected pro¯ts. For ¯rms conducting busi-
nesses with extremely high or extremely low expected cash-°ows, the opposite holds.
With increasing length of the credit relation, they face a higher probability of ine±-
cient liquidation. If we accept that small and medium-sized businesses typically run a
moderate risk of ¯nancial distress, we might conjecture that particularly those smaller
¯rms are interested in keeping up multiple credit relations with asymmetric banking in-
stitutions.27 At the same time, our model provides an explanation why °uctuations in
companies' return expectations (over time) may lead to frequent changes in the chosen
¯nancing structure.
As long as the relationship bank disposes of an informational advantage over arm's-
length banks, heterogeneous multiple bank ¯nancing leads to a fewer incidences of in-
e±cient credit termination and hence of ¯rm liquidation as compared to homogeneous
27For a detailed analysis of the characteristics of SME loan portfolios, see for instance Jobst (2003).
18multiple bank ¯nancing or a monopoly lending regime, irrespective of borrower quality.
Yet, the relationship bank's fraction of total ¯rm debt has to remain su±ciently small
as to not represent a virtual monopoly. This result is in contrast to Elsas et al. (2004),
who found that with symmetric information, ¯rms with high expected cash-°ows tend
to ¯nance without a relationship bank. Obviously, a heterogeneous banking system
o®ers particular advantages pertaining to information asymmetries between banks. In-
°uencing the degree of information asymmetry may therefore be a policy device for
¯rms of varying quality. For ¯rms with intermediate cash-°ow expectations, it may be
pro¯table to disclose very precise information to the relationship bank.
Interestingly, the banks themselves may have material interest in a heterogeneous bank
¯nancing regime, and hence in competition by other banking institutions. While all
banks bene¯t from a reduction in the ¯rm's default probability, the relationship bank,
in particular, pro¯ts from higher expected gains as compared to monopolistic rela-
tionship banking. These follow from the bene¯cial interplay of her renegotiation- and
coordination-in°uence.
Given the analysis of di®erent ¯nancial systems, it should be interesting to establish the
optimal structure of bank debt from the ¯rm's point of view. Obviously, the optimal
¯nancing structure will depend not only on the borrower quality, as one main result
by Elsas et al. (2004), but also on the transparency of this parameter. A detailed
examination of this question is, however, outside the scope of this paper and is left for
future research.
19Appendix A
For rR to yield a maximum payo® to the relationship bank, the second-order condition
demands that the second-order derivative @2RR
@r2
R
< 0, where RR denotes the relationship
bank's expected payo® from extending the loan: RR = ¼R(renegotiate and extendjxR) =

































































































Note that for @2RR
@r2
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@rR to be either su±ciently large or su±ciently small. Note that
the main results of our model in proposition 1 go through even if we restrict rR to take
on strictly positive values, so that the relationship bank's coordinating impact can only
take the form of the cost-e®ect.
Appendix B
The information structure of the model is as follows. Given the realized project value µ,
private signals are distributed as xRjµ » N(µ; 1
®) and xALjµ » N(µ; 1
¯). For the banks,
after observing their private information, the unknown project value µ is distributed
according to µjxR » N(xR; 1
®) and µjxAL » N(xAL; 1
¯). Moreover, each arm's-length
bank believes the relationship bank's information to be given by xRjxAL » N(xAL;
®+¯
®¯ ).
Additionally, Cov(xR;µjxAL) = 1












20The arm's-length banks' indi®erence condition and threshold x¤



























































































































































































Plugging this in (12) delivers28
K
r




























































































28I am very thankful to an anonymous referee for pointing out an e±cient way of simplifying this
equation
21Appendix C
Proof of Lemma 1:
The e®ect of the relationship bank's private information on the renegotiated repayment











@xR ¡ 1)['(¢) ¡ [1 ¡ ©(¢)]
p
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p
®(µ¤





















Otherwise, rR decreases in xR.
Appendix D











































is negative provided that @2µ¤
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Otherwise, rR increases in ®.
Note that if the cost-e®ect dominates, i.e. @µ¤
1=@rR > 0, the r.h.s. of the above inequal-
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22i.e., for intermediate values of xR. This will ease the condition on @2µ¤
1=(@rR@®). Hence,
for intermediate values of xR it is very likely that rR decreases in ®.
For su±ciently extreme values of xR it is likely that rR increases in ® as the condition
on @2µ¤
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i.e. for extreme values of xR.
If the information-e®ect dominates, however, exactly the opposite holds.
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